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Studies in labor economics face severe difficulties when identifying the relationship between
wages and labor productivity. This paper presents a novel identification strategy and
demonstrates that the connection between wages and labor productivity is remarkably
robust even when institutional constraints serve to distort the relationship. Identification
is achieved by considering injuries to professional football players as an exogenous shock to
labor productivity. This is an ideal empirical setting because injured players in the NFL
can not be replaced easily because franchises are constrained by the salary cap. Injuries
are shown to play a major role in franchise success and a tight connection between wages
and marginal productivity emerges. This is in spite of regulatory frictions that serve to
hold down wages for some workers.
JEL codes: J31, Z22
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1 Introduction
In textbook labor markets wages are exactly equal to the employee’s marginal contribution to
the firm’s revenue, known as marginal revenue product (W = MRP ). If the firm is tempted
to pay less than this, competition ensures that the worker can always find alternative work
at W =MRP and the firm can always find another worker willing to work at W =MRP in
the event that the employee demands more. This result is found in economic models across
the discipline. In macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations it is often assumed
explicitly that workers are paid their marginal product (Romer, 2011). In modern models
of the labor market the competitive labor market is often working in the background. For
example, in bilateral bargaining, wages may deviate from marginal revenue product according
to how surpluses from production are split, but the employee’s participation constraint is
defined by their outside option, which is assumed to be equal to their marginal product in
alternative employment (Binmore, 2007; Ashenfelter and Card, 2011).
Despite the equality between wages and marginal product being a fundamental result in the
discipline, modern empirical studies tend to avoid testing the relationship. This is because
observing and measuring the marginal productivity of labor is usually not possible. Instead,
the literature typically uses secondary datasets of matched workers and firms to examine
differences in earnings and uses panel data methods to control for heterogeneity in labor
productivity. These studies have provided indirect evidence that wages may depart from
∗i.gregory-smith@sheffield.ac.uk; University of Sheffield, 9 Mappin Street, S1 4DT. UK. Tel: +44(0)114 22
23317.
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marginal productivity for particular groups such as women (Goldin et al., 2017; Hellerstein
et al., 1999) and black men and women (Charles and Guryan, 2008). Other studies find that
competitive market forces dominate pay-setting concerns even in controversial settings such
as the executive labor market (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013). However,
none of these studies actually measures worker productivity because they do not assess the
individual’s marginal contribution to the firm’s revenue.
A small body of work has tried to measure marginal productivity directly. The approach
requires observations of firm’s output, the assignment of a production function so that the
individual contribution to the output can be plausibly determined as well as wages paid to the
individual workers. For example, Scully (1974) estimates marginal productivity of baseball
players by assessing the effect of their performance on the probability of winning and the
elasticity of the franchise’s revenue to winning. Frank (1984) estimates the marginal produc-
tivity of salesmen in 13 automobile dealerships based on the number of sales and the piece
rate paid to each salesmen to infer the relationship between wages and productivity. Frank
(1984) finds that wages are far more compressed than the variation in marginal productivity
estimates would imply. Lazear (2000) uses individual data on auto glass installers to demon-
strate the productivity gains associated with moving from hourly wages to piece rates and
notes that workers on average see their pay rise by less than the productivity gains. However,
confirming the relationship between individual productivity and individual wages is difficult
because of standard identification issues such as omitted variable bias and reserve causality. It
is unlikely that all relevant variables determining marginal revenue product can be measured
without error and in Lazear (2000) there is clear evidence that the structure of wages impacts
worker productivity. Therefore, a source of exogenous variation in productivity, together with
individual data on wages and productivity is necessary to identify the relationship between
wages and labor productivity.
This paper uses injuries to professional American Football players in the National Football
League (NFL) to establish a direct link between wages and marginal productivity. The NFL
offers an exceptional opportunity to identify the relationship between wages and marginal
productivity. Injuries occur frequently in the NFL and team franchises are unable to replace
injured players easily because the NFL operates a hard salary cap for every franchise in
the league. The marginal dollar value of talent to the franchise is equal to the marginal
change in win probability from employing the talent multiplied by the dollar value of a win
(Szymanski, 2006). Therefore, the financial impact of an injury is the expected value lost
from the reduced probability of winning. If the equality between wages and marginal product
holds, the financial loss should be equal to the injured player’s wage; a dollar of injured talent
is a dollar of productivity lost.
Identification of the relationship between wages and productivity is possible because injuries
do not fall evenly upon franchises. In fact, franchises experience significant variation in terms
of the injuries they receive. Even a single injury to a star player can have a major impact on
a season. Consider the 2011 Indianapolis Colts, who lost 14 out of a total of 16 games when
their star quarterback Peyton Manning missed the season with a neck injury. In that year,
Manning was paid $26.4M or 13% of the salary cap for no on field productivity. If Manning’s
wages were equal to his marginal revenue product one would expect the franchise to lose an
equivalent amount of revenue from having their worst season in 20 years.
An alternative approach to identification has been undertaken by Nguyen and Nielsen (2014).
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Therein, stock price reactions to the unexpected deaths2 of top executives are used to estimate
the relationship between executive compensation and their contribution to the firm’s market
capitalisation. The authors find that higher paid CEOs do indeed have higher contributions
to shareholder value. This is a strong result but the NFL setting employed in this paper
offers some advantages in terms of identification. First, the incidence of sudden deaths to the
CEO is rare, only 81 CEOs died at US firms unexpectedly between 1991 and 2008. Second,
and perhaps more significantly, the CEO’s value must be estimated with reference to the
expected cost and benefits of the incoming replacement. For example, if the market believes
that the incoming CEO is, in expectation, just as good value as the deceased CEO, the market
reaction should be zero. The NFL setting does not suffer from this complication because the
hard salary cap prevents highly paid injured players being replaced with like-for-like players3.
Third, the stock market reaction must reflect only expected productivity differences between
the deceased and incoming CEO. This is perhaps a strong assumption if the market negatively
prices the uncertainty introduced when the CEO suddenly dies. For example, might other
key employees now take the opportunity to leave the company? Therefore, while shocks
to productivity can occur in other employment settings it is the high frequency of injuries,
together with variation in player wages and the hard salary cap in the NFL offers specific
advantages in terms of identification. Additionally, unlike some empirical settings, all data
necessary for analysis are in the public domain including: player wages, contracts and precise
statistical measures of performance, and the market’s expectation of performance is captured
by the betting odds prior to kickoff.
The following section outlines the relevant economic theory associated with the wages of
professional sportsmen. One complication is that institutional features of the NFL, including
the salary cap itself, may affect the market clearing wage rate for talent. In section 2.1, the
possibility of injury is added to the baseline model and it is shown that the prospect of injury
does not impact upon the market clearing wage of talent. However, whether player wages
are actually below, equal to, or above marginal product is ultimately matter for empirical
examination. Section 3 introduces the data and presents descriptive statistics, before the
econometric estimation of whether W =MRP in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Wages and productivity in the NFL
Fort and Quirk (1995) is a well known model in the literature that captures the essential
features of the NFL labor market. The problem for team i is to choose a level of talent ti to
maximise profits4 πi.
2The use of unexpected deaths in post as an identification strategy has been used in other empirical settings
such as Jones and Olken (2005) who use unexpected deaths of country leaders to explain country growth rates.
3Even if a franchise is able to reorganise its team in the event of an injury to, for example the starting
quarterback (QB), with an equally talented QB, it can only free up the salary cap space to do this by releasing
talent from elsewhere in the team, thereby suffering a loss of productivity from those players. In practice, when
starting QBs get injured it is almost always the job of the substantially lower paid backup QB to take the field
until the starting QB recovers.
4Profit maximisation is the objective typically assumed in the literature for NFL franchises (Vrooman, 1995).
Another possibility is that franchises maximise wins (Ke´senne, 2000b) subject to a profit constraint (which
could be negative if the owner is willing to bankroll the franchise). While win maximisation is thought to be
more appropriate in some European sports (Garcia-del Barrio and Szymanski, 2009), profit maximisation is a
reasonable approximation for North American sports (Zimbalist, 2003)
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πi = Ri(wi(ti))− cti (1)
The share of talent tiT , generates a share of wins wi =
ti
T in a season. The share of wins
generates revenue Ri. Each unit of talent costs c in wages so team i’s wage bill is cti. There
are no fixed costs. Total talent in the league is fixed at T units of talent5. With each team in
the league simultaneously maximising profits, the laissez-faire equilibrium condition is:
∂R
∂ti
=
∂R
∂wi
∂w
∂ti
=
∂R
∂tj
= c∗ (2)
Each team in the league increases their share of the talent until the marginal revenues from
talent are equal and equal to the marginal cost of talent6. Consequently players receive their
marginal product in wages. Note this does not imply equal talent shares. In Fort and Quirk
(1995), team i is able to leverage its talent stock to produce more revenue than team j because
it draws from a larger fan base. A strong-drawing team will continue to increase their talent
stock from weak-drawing teams until marginal revenues are equalised. This is the ‘dominant
team’ problem or the problem of ‘unbalanced contests’ (See Borland and Macdonald (2003)
for a review). A desire for more balanced contests and less certain outcomes is the basis for
regulations such as the salary cap.
The NFL salary cap constrains choices over talent with a view to restoring a more equal
distribution of talent. Each team’s annual wage bill must be below a limit7 determined by a
fraction k of total league revenues ΣR:
cti ≤ C¯ hence c ≤
C¯
ti
(3)
where C¯ = kΣR; k < 1
With c = C¯ti equilibrium wages clear below the marginal revenue of talent
∂R
∂t > c =
C¯
ti
. If
the cap C¯ binds on both franchises then talent and wins are distributed evenly with wiwj =
5It is argued that this is the appropriate assumption for a domestic league, such as the NFL, that is effectively
closed to international talent (Ke´senne, 2014). This assumption implies that a when a team hires new talent
it takes it away from another team in the league. This assumption is not appropriate for leagues open to
international labor such as Association Football in the English Premier League where talent can be easily hired
from Europe.
6An alternative equilibrium condition is discussed by Symanski (2006). Therein a strong argument is made
that the choice made by teams in most professional sports is one over budget for talent and that because
choices over budget are made simultaneously and independently by the teams (a` la Nash-Cournot), teams
do not internalise the externality that increasing their budget imposes on the other team. The result is that
budget choices act as strategic substitutes and marginal revenues from talent are not equalised. However, for
our purposes the simpler ‘Walrasian’ equilibrium (Ke´senne, 2014) is appropriate as talent supply in the NFL
is fixed making teams much more aware of the externalities that their hiring choices impose. Additionally,
budgets are actually fixed by the salary cap.
7The cap is actually a window as NFL franchises must satisfy cti > C;C = lΣR, l < k. While theoretically,
a team could desire to spend less on talent than allowed by the lower limit, more often than not, it is the upper
limit that binds on NFL franchises.
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ti
tj
=
tj
ti
= 1. The impact of the cap on franchise profits is theoretically mixed. Since wages
are held lower, profits increase (especially for the smaller franchises) but, since talent is not
always able to move to where it is most profitable, franchises (particularly larger ones) lose
profits to misallocation (Ke´senne, 2000a, 2014).
The other main regulations with the claimed intention of promoting competitive balance
currently in operation in the NFL are the reverse order of finish college draft system and
revenue sharing. Under the draft, the worst performing teams from the prior year get the
first choice from the pool of graduating college students entering the league. However, the
literature has emphasised the ‘invariance principle’ (Rottenberg, 1956), which, in the spirit of
the Coase theorem, argues that the initial allocation of talent does not affect final distribution
of talent when talent can be traded easily between teams (though it is debateable whether
this is in fact the case). Additionally, franchises in the NFL share approximately 60% of their
revenue. Quirk and Fort (1992) show that revenue sharing in the standard model reduces
demand for talent therefore lowers the market clearing wage relative to what would occur
under profit maximisation and no revenue sharing but does not affect competitive balance8.
Therefore, it is the salary cap in the NFL which potentially plays the most important role in
affecting competitive balance and the extent to which players’ wages are tied to the players’
marginal products.
2.1 Injuries
In Fort and Quirk (1995) the choices over talent map one-to-one with wins. I now extend their
baseline model to consider the uncertainty that is introduced when injuries shock the talent
stock. This section also considers the assumption underpinning the identification strategy
that will be used when estimating the relation between wages and marginal productivity.
Let team i experience a talent shock due to injury µi ∼ N(0, σ). Ex ante, teams can not forsee
injuries to their talent or their rival’s talent so the expectation of the shock is normalised to
zero. Positive realisations of µˆ can be interpreted as injuries to the opposing team (µˆi+µˆj = 0).
In the NFL, talent is distributed unevenly between players within a team so an injury to a
single star player could be enough to change the sign of µˆ. A team is unable to replenish its
talent stock after the injury shock until the next season because of the salary cap. The wages
of injured players must be honoured and count towards the cap in the NFL.
When i plays j, the probability p that i wins is affected by the realisation of shock. Talent
stock T in the league (after all injuries are realised) is fixed and normalised to 1. At the
start of the season spending on talent by the teams is equal as determined by the salary cap
ti = tj =
C¯
c .
Prob(wini = 1) = p =
ti + µˆi
T
(4)
Injury shocks reduce the probability of winning and because wins generate revenue, expected
revenue falls. If talent earns its marginal product, the total injury bill (holding j′s injuries
constant) equals the expected loss in revenue L:
8Alternative models of franchise behaviour such as win maximisation as presented by Ke´senne (2014) show
that revenue sharing increases the clearing rate for wages and could promote balance.
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c∗µˆ =
∂R
∂ti
.µˆ =
∂R
∂wi
.
∂wi
∂ti
µˆ = L (5)
Equation 5 is the key equality that this paper wishes to test. With data on injuries and player
wages, the dollar value sitting out due to injury c∗µˆ can be observed. While it is not possible
to observe directly the franchise revenue lost to injury ∂R∂ti .µˆ it can be calculated by estimating
the reduction in win probability from injured players ∂wi∂ti .µˆ together with the marginal revenue
from winning ∂R∂wi . This task is conducted in section 4.
The crucial identifying assumption for an unbiased estimate of ∂R∂wi .
∂wi
∂ti
µˆ is that the expectation
of the injury shock is zero and remains zero after conditioning upon the choice of talent by
franchise i, that is E(µi|ti) = 0. In other words, injuries are assumed to be exogenous to talent
choice. What are the threats to this identifying assumption? First, because the collisions that
occur on the field of play are deliberate actions one may reasonably question whether injuries
are not also a part of deliberate strategy by opposing teams. Moreover, it will be seen below
that injuries during the game, particularly to key players such as the starting quarterback
significantly impact the likelihood of winning that game. This provides an incentive to injure
opponents and an incentive to take actions that mitigate the injury risk. Of course, targeting
players for injury is illegal and heavy penalties are imposed for any team caught doing it,
thereby reducing the incentive. However, there is sufficient ambiguity in tackling that a
policy of targeting players for injury could go undetected and anecdotal evidence suggests
that ‘bounties’, small bonuses for a knock-out hit on an opponent, was a historical practice.
This was brought to light in the case of the New Orleans Saints who were heavily penalised for
allegedly offering bounties for players between 2009 and 2011. Coaches and players involved
were given suspensions and the franchise was fined $0.5m and, more significantly, forfeited
their draft selections for 2012 and 2013. An issue emerges if high earning players are more
likely to be targeted than regular players9. This potentially introduces a correlation between
talent ti and the injury shock µi. The pool of injured players from which lost productivity is
being estimated could then over represent highly paid star players.
To indicate whether or not this is a likely problem affecting the estimates, two tests are
provided in the appendix. Table A1 performs a balance test on the control variables, according
to whether an injury occurred to the starting quarterback during the game. If such injuries
occur randomly, there should be no significant differences in the means of the observable
variables. All the monetary variables are calculated net of the opposition so should be zero
in expectation, irrespective of whether or not an injury occurs to the starting quarterback.
This is indeed the case, for the total amount of injured money sitting on the bench, the
gini coefficient, the ratio of starting wages to non-starting wages and the total wage bill.
Additionally, the both in the injured and non-injured groups, the team plays Away from
home 50% of the time and there is no difference in the number of rest days prior to the match.
Crucially, the market is unable to predict within game injuries as the difference in the vegas
spread is also approximately zero for the two groups. The table also shows the importance of
the injury to the quarterback. The backup quarterback’s passing rating is 16 points less than
the starting quarterback’s passing rating at the mean.
9Although the main identifying specification is restricted to the quarterback position only.
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The second test is reported in Table A2 and explores the relationship between injuries and
player wages in more detail. Supporting the identifying assumption that injuries are exogenous
to talent choices, Table A2 finds no robust relationship between injuries and player wages.
There are several plausible reasons why injuries remain exogenous despite apparent incentives
to injure star players. First, many injuries simply occur off the field or are triggered during
training and therefore are not the result of a single deliberate collision by an opponent. Second,
to the extent that opponents may seek to injure talented players more than non-talented
players there is an equal incentive for teams to protect their talented players10. Third, it is
well known that there exists an informal code whereby players taking ‘dirty shots’ can expect
retaliation by the more physical players on the field and sometimes a rebuke from their own
teammates. Fourth, players often continue to play through knocks received during a game
and are only diagnosed with a serious injury after the game. This means the beneficiaries of
an injury to a star player could be the teams who have yet to play against the injured player,
rather than the team responsible for the injury. Given that any player can pick up an injury
at any time, both on and off the field and even after a serious collision with an opposing player
it is very difficult to predict whether or not an injure will occur, what the nature of that injury
would be and the likely duration of the injury. Since the market cannot predict injuries, it is
argued that there always remains a substantial stochastic element to any footballer’s injury.
Section 4 tests whether equation 5 holds, although it can be noted here that are reasons
to suspect departures from this equality. In particular, with the salary cap binding, the
total injury bill equals C¯c µˆ < c
∗µˆ = L. If wages are constrained below the market clearing
equilibrium due to the salary cap the dollar value sitting out due to injury will be less than
the franchise revenue lost due to injury. Players may be willing to accept with such terms
if playing for an NFL franchise affords outside earnings such as lucrative deals for product
endorsements. On the other hand, since entry to the league through the draft is controlled by
the existing player’s union, it is possible that wages are held up above their market clearing
rate for some players, for example, in favour of veteran players at the expense of rookies.
Therefore, whether players earn their marginal product is ultimately an empirical question 11.
3 Data
An advantage of the NFL setting is that most of the data necessary for analysis is located
in the public domain. Detailed information on player wages and bonuses from 2011-2015
was collected from spotsrac.com. Richard Borghesi provided the author with data on salaries
from 1995-2001 which had been collected from USAToday12. While a player’s compensation
can exhibit complicating features such as singing on bonuses and performance incentives the
10The reason that the position of Left Tackle is the second highest paid position is because their job is to
protect the Quarterback. This is described in detail by Lewis (2007).
11The extent to which competition is balanced in a season is also affected by the realisation of the injury
shock in a similar way wi
wj
= ti+µˆi
tj+µˆj
. Since the expectation of the shock is zero, competitive balance ex-ante
is unchanged. However, the variance of the shock will influence the realisation of the distribution of wins. If
teams are closely balanced ex ante, the prospect of injury is likely to reduce balance as injuries are realised
unevenly between teams. If teams are unbalanced ex ante, the prospect of irreplaceable injured talent could
increase balance ex post as the dominant team has more talent to lose. However, the focus in this paper is on
wages and productivity rather than competitive balance.
12Unfortunately, USAToday has withdrawn their salary data from the public domain.
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bottom line is a ‘CAP number’ which is assigned to each year of the player’s contract for
the purposes of monitoring the franchise’s compliance with the annual Salary Cap. It is the
CAP number which represents the opportunity cost of the player and is essentially sunk by
the franchise at the start of the season. If the player is injured, and can not play, the CAP
number remains unchanged for the duration of the season.
Performance data was hand collected from sports-reference.com. The data is at a high level of
disaggregation. In addition to a large number of variables which captures team performance
in each game, performance statistics for each player is available on a game by game basis.
For each season, each player is assigned a performance rating and for each game the Quarter
Back, the highest paid and most important position in the NFL is assigned a passing rating
based on each play that the player made during the game. Additionally, information from
betting markets can be incorporated to capture the expectation of a franchise’s performance
in each game.
Data on injuries, games missed and substitution of starting players for backup players is
obtained from sports-reference.com and mangameslost.com. Caporale and Collier (2015) cal-
culate the number of man-games lost over the course of the season due to injuries and use the
variable as a control in a regression of win percentage over an NFL season, exploring the im-
pact of rebalancing mechanisms such as the college draft. This paper adopts a fundamentally
different approach by exploiting data on injuries to individual players both over the course
of a season and during individual games, with a view to matching this information to each
player’s wage. This permits an analysis of injuries at the team-season level, the team-game
level and, in respect of the quarterback position, within games.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
A large degree of variation in player wages will assist the identification of the causal impact
of a dollar lost to injury on the probability of winning. Table 1 shows mean payments by key
positions between 2011 and 2015. Panel A provides a breakdown of the different elements
compensation by position. In addition, to salary, players receive additional payments when
signing the contract Singing and making the playing squad Roster. There is substantial
variation between positions. The Quarter Back (QB) commands a salary that is, on average,
twice that of the running back. Panel A also shows that QBs receive more supplements to
their salary. The final column in Panel A labelled ‘Dead Money’ records the amount charged
to the Cap in the event that the player is cut in that year. Dead money indicates that the
franchise has committed to paying the player an amount which can not be recovered if the
player is cut before the end of their contract.
As well as substantial variation between positions there is substantial variation within posi-
tions. Panel B shows the breakdown by year of the Cap hit (all elements of pay charged to
the Cap for each year) within team franchises. The standard deviation on the QBs Cap hit
implies is $5m, more than twice the mean salary with larger variation at the top end of the
distribution. Consistent with Rosen’s 1981 ‘superstar’ theory of wages, the 90th percentile
QB is paid 10 times more than the median QB, with the 99th percentile paid a further 1.5
times the 90th percentile QB. Within the same position and team, variation is even greater.
The starting QB is paid, on average, 10 times more than the backup QB. If the starting QB
is injured, one can expect a substantial reduction in the probability that the team wins the
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Table 1: Player Wages 2011-2015
Panel A: Mean wages by position
Position N Salary Signing Roster Dead Money
Offense
Quarter Back 467 $2,094k $1,006k $248k $4,953k
Left Tackle 283 $2,044k $629k $162k $3,504k
Running Back 697 $1,019k $295k $96k $1,044k
Wide Receiver 1,091 $1,133k $416k $106k $1,786k
Defence
Defensive line
Line Backer 738 $1,221k $515k $134k $2,001k
Corner back 973 $1,217k $402k $124k $1,556k
‘Dead money’ is charge to the cap if the player is cut.
Signing bonuses are paid upon signing.
Roster bonuses are conditional upon making the active roster.
Panel B: Cap hit Inequality Measures
Year Team Cap Mean S.D Gini 99by90 90by50 75by25
2011 $120.0m $1,806k $2,410k 0.5679 2.566 6.744 4.659
2012 $120.6m $1,719k $2,441k 0.5818 2.582 7.156 4.036
2013 $123.0m $1,791k $2,513k 0.5885 2.550 7.301 4.167
2014 $133.0m $1,900k $2,704k 0.5927 2.566 7.170 4.444
2015 $143.3m $2,009k $2,842k 0.5984 2.757 7.369 4.620
Pooled $1,843k $2,587k 0.5870 2.665 7.070 4.352
Pooled QB $3,744k $5,075k 0.6352 1.501 10.427 8.519
All wages in nominal values.
90by50 Divides wages at the 90th percentile by the 50th percentile.
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Table 2: Player Injuries
Panel A: 1995-2001
Injury Frequency
Position N N injured Missed 16 Missed 7-15 Missed 1-6 Missed 0
Offense
Quarterback 522 142 0.029 0.081 0.163 0.728
Running Back 1,051 187 0.021 0.031 0.126 0.822
Wide Receiver 1,102 190 0.018 0.038 0.116 0.828
O Line 2,423 503 0.022 0.043 0.144 0.791
Defence
D Line 1,717 312 0.019 0.026 0.137 0.818
Line Backer 1,431 237 0.018 0.030 0.117 0.836
Cover 1,958 335 0.018 0.030 0.122 0.829
Special T eams 261 5 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.981
Panel B: 2011-2015
Injury Frequency
Position N N injured Missed 16 Missed 7-15 Missed 1-6 Missed 0
Offense
Quarterback 349 92 0.049 0.106 0.109 0.736
Running Back 574 115 0.017 0.052 0.130 0.801
Wide Receiver 796 167 0.013 0.053 0.145 0.790
O Line 1,635 439 0.026 0.072 0.174 0.731
Defence
D Line 1,144 227 0.013 0.047 0.140 0.801
Line Backer 991 230 0.019 0.052 0.159 0.770
Cover 1,384 328 0.017 0.062 0.160 0.762
Special T eams 163 1 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.994
Notes:
1. N counts the number of player-seasons at each position.
2. N injured counts the number of player-seasons with any injury of any duration.
3. Injury frequency is the proportion of players who missed any part of X number of games that year. For
example, in panel A, only 2.9% of QBs missed the entire season but only 72.8% of QBs went the entire season
without missing any playing time due to injury.
4. O Line comprises Guards, Centers, Tackles and Tight Ends. D Line comprises and Defensive Ends
and Tackles. Cover comprises Safeties and Corners and Defensive Backs. Special T eams comprises Kickers,
Punters and Long Snappers.
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game. Further descriptives are provided in the appendix that demonstrate the high degree of
wage variation between NFL players.
Table 1 also shows inflation in nominal wages at the mean over a relatively short sample
period. There are small increases in the Gini coefficient over the same period, implying that
the increase has gone to paying the higher paid players a little more. This has occurred
alongside increases in the overall team cap. The overall cap is determined each year by a
formula based on approximately 48% of total league revenues. If the salary cap is increasing,
it implies aggregate franchise revenues are increasing. The Cap has increased substantially
since its introduction in 1994 at $34.6m.
Panel A of Table 2 introduces the second time period for which data is available and shows the
incidence of injury over the season by position for the years 1995-2001. Season long injuries
occur relatively infrequently, with only 2.9% of QBs missing the entire season due to injury.
However, injuries frequently cause players to miss part of the season. Only 72.8% of QBs
manage the entire season without any injury at all. Injury rates at other positions are lower,
with 79% of Offensive Linesmen to 83.6% of Linebackers going the whole season uninjured.
Injuries to Punters and Kickers in the Special Teams are very rare.
How has the incidence of injury changed over time? The NFL has become more conscious
of ‘player safety’ over the sample period. In April 2016, a federal appeals court upheld an
out of court settlement between the NFL and multiple concussion lawsuits filed by former
players. The settlement is thought to be worth approximately US$1 billion and will cover
approximately 20,000 players. Since 2009, the NFL has introduced a ‘concussion protocol’
and tightened its rules on concussions. However, it is unclear whether this will increase or
decrease the number of observed cases of injury in the data. While the true injury risk is
likely to be reduced, the recorded number of injuries might increase because the ability to
diagnose this type of injury has improved13. Other restrictions on blocking and tackling have
also been introduced to decrease the likelihood of an injury occurring. For example, in 2016,
the ‘chop block’, where a player blocks another high on the body, while a teammate hits the
same player low, became illegal due to risk of knee injuries.
Referring to panel B of Table 2 which pools data across the years 2011-2015, the incidence of
being injured for the whole season is 2 percentage points higher for Quarterbacks compared
to the 1995-2001 period. While a small increase in absolute terms, this is two-thirds higher
than the prior period. It appears the reduced injury risk has been offset by the increased
rate of injury detection (and perhaps an increased fear of litigation) between the two periods.
However, the likelihood of the Quarterback going the entire season uninjured is marginally
higher in the later period. Together, these descriptive statistics are consistent with increased
protection of the Quarterback position so that minor injuries occur less often, but when major
injuries do occur they are treated more seriously and force longer absences from the field of
play.
The differences between the time periods at other positions are not so clear. The rates of
season long injury are broadly similar in the second period and marginally fewer players go
the entire season uninjured. It would appear that it has been the Quarterbacks who have
been the main beneficiaries of the rule changes that have targeted player safety. It is clear
13As of 2016, whenever a potential concussion is identified the player is removed from the game and an
independent Neurotrauma consultant will examine the player.
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Table 3: Injury Types 2011:2015
Injury N Percent Duration St. Dev
(weeks)
Knee 1,224 21.22% 8.85 13.08
Ankle 710 12.31% 4.45 6.71
Hamstring 668 11.58% 3.22 4.44
Leg 408 7.07% 5.48 11.37
Shoulder 380 6.59% 5.96 8.55
Concussion 377 6.54% 3.27 6.07
Foot 375 6.50% 7.25 9.60
Groin 240 4.16% 2.81 3.01
Hand 203 3.52% 4.72 4.92
Back 174 3.02% 5.24 9.04
Chest 158 2.74% 5.24 7.50
Hip 132 2.29% 7.15 12.09
Illness 132 2.29% 4.98 12.19
Neck 103 1.79% 6.22 10.64
Undisclosed 99 1.72% 12.70 10.48
Achilles 96 1.66% 14.11 11.57
Arm 85 1.47% 9.44 5.75
Head 84 1.46% 2.57 3.51
Elbow 60 1.04% 4.41 5.12
Other 60 1.04% 3.33 3.26
Total 5,768 100.00% 5.95 9.58
Notes:
1. N counts the number of unique injuries to players in the NFL between 2011 and 2015
2. Percent is the percentage of all injuries accounted for by the injury type
3. In 2.7% of cases, two body parts were identified as injured. To avoid double counting, the injury was assigned
to the first recorded category. E.g. “Knee/ankle” was classified as a knee injury, whereas “Ankle/knee” was
classified as an ankle injury
then that the Quarterbacks, are not only paid very differently to other players but experience
injuries differently as well. This motivates a separate analysis of injuries and wages to QBs
below.
Table 3 uses more detailed data on injuries from mangameslost.com for the period 2011-2015.
Here, injuries are classified to all NFL players on a game by game basis. Duration is calculated
by taking the number of days from being declared injured until the date of the next game when
the player was available for selection and the mean number of weeks is reported. Duration
is right censored at seven days after end of the regular season. Knee injuries are the most
common injuries and keep players out for a relatively long period of time, almost 9 weeks on
average. Only 6.5% of injuries were due to concussions and these players were rested for an
average of 3 weeks.
3.2 Injuries and the probability of winning: Season and Game level
The data allow estimation of the impact of injuries on the probability of willing at different
levels of aggregation: at level of the season, the game and within the game itself. For the
purposes of identification, injuries that occur to Quarterbacks within the game itself represents
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Table 4: Injuries on the probability of winning: season level 1995:2001
OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Injured money -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.23***
(-3.39) (-3.39) (-3.05) (-3.05)
Control Variables
Ln(Wage bill) 1.93*** 1.93*** 2.56*** 2.56***
(3.79) (3.79) (4.81) (4.81)
Ln(Wage bill standard deviation) -1.39*** -1.83***
(-3.59) (-4.71)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 213 213 213 213
Number of teams 31 31
R-squared 0.119 0.119 0.153 0.153
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the tightest specification. Prior to this, let it be shown that total injuries that occur over a
season are important enough to affect franchise’s record over that season and that injuries
prior to match day also have an impact on the likelihood of winning that particular match.
Using data aggregated at the season level analysis for the period 1995-2001, the dependent
variable in Table 4 is the percentage of games won by team i in season t expressed in log
odds wit = ln(wit/1 − wit). Estimation is by OLS and fixed effects (FE). The FE estimator
controls for unobserved team level fixed effects. Given that it is likely there are unobserved
factors that could contribute to the winning record, the FE estimates are preferred, alebit in
practice the estimated coefficients are similar.
The main explanatory variable of interest is Ln Injured money and is defined as the natural
log of the total amount spent on player wages while the players were injured. For example, a
player who misses eight games out of the sixteen games in the regular season due to injury,
would add 50% of their total compensation to Injured money. Total compensation in this
dataset is the sum of salary and bonuses received during the year. Controlling for team’s wage
bill for the season, the total amount spent on players, the impact of Injured money on the
franchise’s playing record over the regular season is explored. Since not all teams qualify for
the small number of games that occur postseason the analysis is restricted to the regular season
only. The median team wins and loses 8 games in the season (an 8-8 record). The estimated
coefficients on LnInjured money show that injured money is important for a franchise’s
success in that season. The standard deviation of Ln Injured money is close is 1.05, making
interpretation of the effect size relatively straightforward. Taking the FE estimate in column
(4), a one standard deviation change in Injured money changes the log odds of winning by
0.23. This implies a team with an 8-8 record who experiences a one standard deviation injury
shock sees their record fall on average by one game, to 7-9. Likewise, a two standard deviation
injury decrease in Injured money implies the median team would improve to 10-6 which is
typically required to qualify for the post-season games with the prospect of playing in the
Super Bowl.
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Ln(Wage bill) is the natural log of the total amount spent by the franchise on player wages
during the season. If every team spent exactly the same on player wages as implied by
the theoretical version of the cap in Section 2, then this variable would not be identified.
However, in practice, there is significant variation between teams spending and within team-
years. Smaller franchises may not wish to spend the full amount permitted by the cap,
although they must spend at least 90% of the cap. Additionally, since the cap permits certain
elements of pay, such as signing bonuses to be charged over the life of the cap (see appendix)
teams can strategically vary the amount charged to the cap in any one year. For these, reasons
the wage bill does vary and as expected, teams that pay more in a season, win more games
on average in that season. From the FE estimate of column 4, a 10% increase in franchise
spending in that season implies approximately 0.25 increase in the logodds, which is close to
the same effect size as a one standard deviation injury shock.
Table 4 also reports another interesting control variable. It has been argued in the literature
that wage inequality within teams diminishes team performance (Borghesi, 2008) perhaps due
to a withdrawal of effort among relatively low-paid players. Ln(Wage bill standard deviation)
measures the within team wage spread in each year and estimated coefficients are negative.
From the FE result, a 10% increase in the standard deviation of the wage bill, holding the
total bill constant, reduces the median team’s record by approximately 0.7 of a win. However,
care is required when interpreting this estimate. A team that spends more typically does so
by recruiting more star players, or by paying more for star players. This inevitably increases
the standard deviation of wages within the team. Indeed, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
between the wage bill and its standard deviation is 0.889, highly collinear. Since it is unlikely
that significantly reducing the inequality of wages within the team is feasible without also
reducing the total talent in the team one should caution against a strategy focused solely on
wage equality without regard to total team spend.
While analysis at the season level provides a broad overview of the impact of injuries, a
limitation of the analysis is that it aggregates information across all the games in the season.
Important determinants of match outcomes, such as who the team is playing, the market odds
prior to kick off, whether or not the team is playing at home can only be controlled for on a
game by game basis. Therefore a more precise analysis is offered with data in Table 5, which
reports the game level analysis where each of the 32 NFL franchises play 16 games over 5
regular seasons 2011-2015. Additionally, the wage data available in the period 2011-2015 is
more detailed than that from 1995-2001 because the data records the official ‘cap number’
that represents the charge to the salary cap for the franchise over that season.
For each game, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a win is recorded and zero
otherwise. Estimation is by logit and a conditional logit which controls for team level fixed
effects. Controlling for fixed effects over a five year period should be a reasonably tight
specification because unobservables such as training facilities and franchise culture should not
vary a great deal over this time period. Ln Injured Money (net) is the natural log of total
wages for players who were unable to play that game net of their opposition’s injured wages.
This variable mirrors the injury shock c.µi outlined in the theory section above. Table 5
reports the estimated coefficients and marginal effects for the main variables of interest are
interpreted below.
The estimated coefficient of the raw effect of Ln Injured Money (net) in column (1) implies
an average marginal effect (AME) of -0.07. A one standard deviation change in this variable
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Table 5: Injuries on the probability of winning: game level 2011:2015
Logit Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln Injured Money (net) -0.29*** -0.18*** -0.13** -0.29*** -0.19*** -0.12*
(-5.18) (-2.93) (-2.01) (-4.88) (-2.88) (-1.73)
Control Variables
Starter Gini (net) -0.20 0.33 -0.51 0.23
(-0.42) (0.68) (-0.92) (0.40)
Starter/Non-Starter (net) -0.041 -0.037 0.011 -0.045
(-0.32) (-0.28) (0.081) (-0.31)
Away -0.55*** 0.036 -0.59*** -0.038
(-6.79) (0.39) (-7.02) (-0.40)
Ln Wage Bill (net) 1.40*** -0.013 1.21*** 0.12
(4.58) (-0.040) (3.62) (0.33)
Rest Days (net) -0.00030 -0.013 -0.00077 -0.013
(-0.018) (-0.77) (-0.046) (-0.75)
Vegas Spread 0.14*** 0.13***
(16.9) (13.4)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,529 2,528 2,528 2,529 2,528 2,528
Number of teams 32 32 32 32 32 32
Estimated coefficients reported not marginal effects.
The estimated coefficient of Ln Injured Money (net) in column (1) implies a marginal effect of -0.07.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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implies an extra win over the course of the season consistent with the result found at the
season level above. When converted to dollars (in millions) the AME is -0.006. A one standard
deviation injury shock is approximately $15.25M in player wages. This implies a one standard
deviation increase in this variable implies a 9 percentage point reduction in the probability of
winning that game (unconditional). With 16 games in the season, the one standard deviation
injury shock implies losing 1.47 games in the season. To equate wages with marginal revenue
product a single win for the franchise would need to be equal to $10.4M.
The control variables that play an important role in win probability include Away, a dummy
which equals 1 for an Away fixture (AME 0.13) and the total wage bill of the franchise net
of the opponent (AME 0.28) in the relevant year. Two measures on inequality within the
franchise are included; the Gini coefficient among starting players and the ratio of the starters
wage bill to non-starters. However, nether of these variables are statistically significant. The
inconsistency between this result and that obtained at the season level, could be explained
by the tighter specification permitted by the game level analysis. In particular, the measures
of wage inequality of at the level of the game now control for the opposition’s inequality and
wage bill as well. Once these variables are included, the measures of wage inequality do not
have a major impact.
The most important control variable for the analysis is the Vegas Spread for each game which
is included in columns (3) and (6). This provides the market’s expectation of the probability
of winning. For each game, an under/over spread is offered on either team. If A plays B and
the Vegas spread is +7, then the market is predicting that A has a 50% chance of winning by
7 or more points and that B has a 50% chance of winning or losing by 7 or less. Card and
Dahl (2011) show this variable is an unbiased predictor of match outcomes and a replication
of their test with this more recent data period is shown in the appendix. The estimated
coefficient in column (6) implies an extra point on the spread is worth 3% in win probability.
Since all the control variables in Table 5 are known to the market prior to kick off, one
would expect them to be priced in to the Vegas Spread, otherwise it would imply outstanding
arbitrage opportunities, such as betting just on away teams. However, as shown in columns
(3) and (6), the control these variables are no longer predictive of the match outcome once the
Vegas Spread is accounted for. However, there remains an effect on the margin of statistical
significance for the main variable of interest Ln Injured Money (net). This is likely due to
some uncertainty prior to kick off surrounding the extent of injury to some players. Whether
a player misses a game due to injury is coded retrospectively as a one or zero and it is not
known whether the market gave an a player who is coded injured some chance of playing prior
to kick off. In other words, the market is unable to price in all injuries perfectly prior to
kick off. The following section presents a more precise analysis using injuries to quarterbacks
during the game itself but even at the broader levels of aggregation presented above, injuries
play a role in winning games.
4 Main Results
4.1 Injuries and the probability of winning: Within game analysis
The most critical position in the NFL is the Quarterback (QB). They are the highest paid
(see above) and play a unique role in the side as they are responsible for play selection as
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well as play execution14. More so than a captain in Association Football or a Point Guard
in Basketball, Quarterbacks have a major bearing on the outcome of the game. In their 53
man squad (roster), a team will employ a starting QB and at least one and sometimes two or
three backup QBs in case of an injury to the starting QB. As such an injury within game to
the starting Quarterback represents the cleanest shock to labor productivity in the NFL.
For the period 2011 to 2015, it is observed in the data from sports-reference.com whether
the starting QB was replaced by the backup QB during any game. One advantage with the
data from this period is that the replacement can be cross-referenced to data on injuries from
mangameslost.com, where the specific nature of the injury, whether it is to the head or other
part of the body, is observed. This means one is able to verify the seriousness of the injury,
so that instances of ‘tactical substitutions’, where the starting QB is not really injured but
replaced by the backup QB for performance reasons can be correctly excluded. On occasions,
QBs are substituted late in the game when the contest is already won and these can also be
excluded. Furthermore, historical match reports were cross-referenced from nfl.com to ensure
the in-game QB substitutions represented genuine injury shocks.
Table 6 shows the results. When the backup QB is required to take the field the team is more
likely to lose by 28 percentage points (average marginal effect ‘Injured QB’ col(1)). Likewise
if the opponent’s QB steps in the team is more likely to win by 28 percentage points. These
estimated effects are equivalent to giving the other team 9.5 points on the spread. Column
(2) confirms that this injury is not predicted by the market prior to kick-off and column (3)
shows this is unaltered by unobserved franchise fixed effects. An injury to the starting QB is
clearly a major shock to the franchise.
Most starting QBs experience variation in form over their career and therefore their contri-
bution relative to a backup QB is likely to vary. It is possible to control for how well a QB
played during the game with their official ‘passing rating’. Passing rating is measured on a
scale from zero to 158.3 points for a perfect game15. The estimated coefficient on passing
rating in column (4) shows how important the QB’s performance is to the probability of win-
ning. A one standard deviation increase in the passing rating corresponds to a 19% point
increase in the likelihood of winning. Backup QBs replacing injured QBs on average have 16
fewer points in passing rating per game, which equates to 12 fewer percentage points in the
likelihood of winning each game. Passing rating is capturing approximately half of the effect
of substituting in the Backup QB. Of course, in any one game a Backup QBs can play well
and help their team win16. However, given the same passing rating in the game, an injury to
the starting QB further reduces the likelihood of winning. It is likely that the weaker passing
game of the backup QB allows the opposition defence to line up against running plays with
greater certainty, rendering non-passing plays less effective. Additionally, to the extent that
the starting QB’s may possess superior leadership skills, are better at changing the play at the
line of scrimmage or are better at running the ball themselves, franchises may benefit from
14Plays are also designed and selected by the Head Coach and Offensive Coordinator
15Four categories are used as a basis for compiling a rating: Percentage of completions per at-
tempt, Average yards gained per attempt, Percentage of touchdown passes per attempt and Percent-
age of interceptions per attempt. A passing rating of over 100 is considered a very good performance
http://www.nfl.com/help/quarterbackratingformula
16Nick Foles won the Most Valuable Player award in his winning Super Bowl appearance in 2017 as a backup
QB with an excellent passing rating of 106.1, 15 points above the average for a starting QB and 26 points
above the average for a backup QB.
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these attributes.
There is considerable variation between franchises in the difference in wages between starting
and backup QBs and therefore the shock of losing the starting QB to injury is also expected
to vary. Column (5) examines ‘∆ Injured-Backup QB wage’ which interacts an injury to the
starting QB during the game with the wage differential between the starting QB and backup
QB who replaced them. The estimated coefficient for this variable implies a one standard
deviation increase in the wage differential is associated with a loss of 7 percentage points
in the likelihood of winning, conditional upon the starting QB getting injured during the
game. For illustrative purposes, a one standard deviation in wage differential is approximately
$11M at the median. Therefore, the implied marginal productivity for $10M of QB wages
would equal approximately 6.6 percentage points in the likelihood of winning each game , or
approximately 1 game over the course of the regular season. Therefore, a win would need to
be worth approximately $10M to the franchise in order to equate median QB wages with their
marginal revenue product. This is almost exactly the same as the estimates obtained above
when adding up the wage bill of injuries at all playing positions, albeit the identification on
QB injuries is much more precise.
As expected, the effects sizes in Table 6 are symmetric for the opposition variables (none
of the differences in magnitude of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant). The
control variables act upon the match outcome in a similar way as in Table 5. The Vegas Spread
remains the most important predictor of the match outcome, albeit the magnitude, conditional
on what the QB achieved the game, is reduced in columns (4) and (5). This is expected as the
market can not predict perfectly how a QB will perform in any one game. After controlling
for V egas Spread, none of the control variables are expected to be statistically significant
as all these variables are public information prior to kickoff. However, a negative coefficient
on Away emerges because the specification requires passing rating (which is not known prior
to kick off) to be held constant. Since passing rating is systematically lower when QBs play
away from home, holding this constant introduces collinearity with Away. If passing rating
is omitted, then the coefficient on Away returns to being statistically insignificant from zero.
Altogether, these estimates imply that an injury to the starting QB has a major bearing
on the outcome of the match and the impact and the size of the effect is proportional to
the wage differential between the starting QB and backup QB. Note that the impact of the
amount of injured money Ln Injured Money(net) is no longer statistically significant after
conditioning on the QB’s performance during the game and the Vegas Spread. Therefore, the
most relevant identifier of a shock to labor productivity among NFL players, appears to be
an injury to the starting QB. As stated above, the estimates imply that a win will need to be
worth approximately $10M to justify the marginal difference in wages between the starting
and backup QBs. The next section seeks to determine whether or not this is the case.
4.2 How much is a win worth?
Starting Quarterbacks are paid on average approximately 10 times the amount of the backup
Quarterback. However, it has been seen that the team is not 10 times less likely to win, rather
approximately 28 percentage points less likely to win each game. If the median 8-8 team was
forced to go the entire season with the backup quarterback they would still be predicted to
win at least 3 or 4 games in the season. Such a team would not make the postseason playoffs
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Table 6: Injuries on the probability of winning: Within game quarterbacks 2011:2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Injured QB -1.18*** -1.28*** -1.24*** -0.72***
(-6.69) (-6.83) (-6.53) (-2.95)
Injured QB (opp) 1.19*** 1.31*** 1.34*** 0.84***
(6.80) (7.02) (7.14) (3.45)
Vegas Spread 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.095*** 0.095***
(18.6) (16.0) (7.74) (7.77)
Passing rating 0.056*** 0.056***
(19.3) (19.3)
Passing rating (opp) -0.058*** -0.058***
(-19.2) (-19.2)
∆ Injured-Backup QB wage -0.048***
(-2.98)
∆ Injured-Backup QB ∆ wage (opp) 0.055***
(3.48)
Control variables
Ln Injured Money (net) -0.028 -0.029
(-0.33) (-0.34)
Starter Gini (net) 0.95 0.98
(1.21) (1.25)
Starter/Non-Starter (net) 0.034 0.034
(0.19) (0.19)
Away -0.25** -0.25**
(-2.01) (-2.00)
Ln Wage Bill (net) 0.41 0.41
(0.65) (0.64)
Rest Days (net) 0.0012 0.00095
(0.055) (0.043)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555
Teams 32 32 32 32 32
Estimated Coefficients after logit (conditional logit for FE) reported.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Franchise Revenues and Income
Revenue Book Value Operating Income
Year N Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Salary Cap
2000 31 $116.20m 19.61 $423.45m 107.45 $15.54m 15.20 $62.17m
2005 32 $188.41m 26.41 $818.97m 134.61 $32.43m 13.14 $85.50m
2008 32 $221.56m 26.73 $1040.00m 177.92 $24.66m 12.30 $116.00m
2009 32 $236.66m 27.60 $1042.50m 188.63 $32.26m 20.54 $123.00m
2010 32 $250.50m 41.34 $1022.44m 223.83 $33.31m 29.57 -
2011 32 $260.78m 39.06 $1036.31m 237.50 $30.60m 23.30 $120.00m
2012 32 $275.72m 55.13 $1106.72m 284.43 $41.11m 44.50 $120.60m
2013 32 $286.47m 60.85 $1165.47m 316.56 $44.03m 48.18 $123.00m
2014 32 $299.22m 63.46 $1427.81m 532.47 $53.32m 50.35 $133.00m
2015 32 $346.59m 69.52 $1966.96m 628.05 $76.21m 50.45 $143.28m
2016 32 $379.91m 75.98 $2338.44m 570.12 $91.53m 52.51 $155.27m
2017 32 $411.13m 92.76 $2522.03m 626.20 $101.38m 58.96 $167.00m
% Change 254% 496% 483% 169%
Notes:
1. Source: Forbes
2. NFL franchises owners opted out of the collective bargaining agreement in 2010 that provides for the salary
cap.
3. There is a mechanical relationship between league wide revenues and the salary cap under the NFL’s
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL franchises and the player’s union the NFLPA. Under the
current agreement, the salary cap is approximately 48.5% of total league revenues.
but how much does winning matter for the revenue of the team? If wages are, on average,
equal to marginal product, the prediction is that the four to five win difference over the season
is worth the difference in wages between the backup and starting QB.
To estimate the impact of winning of franchise finances, data on franchise performance was
merged with data on franchise finances from Forbes. Forbes provided the author with franchise
book values for the years 1995-2017 and franchise revenues for the years 2000 and 2005.
Additionally, revenues and operating income are currently publicly available on the Forbes
website for the years 2008-2017. Table 7 shows the large increase in mean revenues and book
values experienced NFL franchises by between 2000 and 2017 alongside the increase in the
salary cap.
One complication in estimating the elasticity of revenue to a win, is that approximately
60% of franchise revenues are pooled and then redistributed. This is principally through a
collective arrangement to share media revenue. The increase in revenues observed in Table 7
are predominately driven by media revenue and the growth in book values is heavily influenced
by the public subsidisation of new NFL venues. Franchises earn approximately 20% of their
revenue from their venue which is unshared (Vrooman, 2012). Since there are only 16 games
in the regular season, the elasticity of game day attendance to winning is somewhat muted
in the short run (see table A4 appendix). It would appear then, that the majority of revenue
and even the growth in revenues are insensitive to a franchise’s win rate in the short run.
Over a longer period of time, a franchise can generate additional revenues steadily building
up its core support. This raises revenue through game-day gate receipts and merchandise.
Additionally, as the NFL has increased its market reach over the sample period, with regular
season games occurring internationally, in the UK and Mexico, the more sucessful teams
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are the better positioned teams to attract new international support. Additionally, support
for the public subsidisation of NFL infrastructure and franchise stadia is arguably related
to the intensity of local support. But to what extent is winning important in this revenue
development? Vrooman (1995) estimates a three-year win elasticity over the period 1990-1992
of .12, which implies if the average win rate doubles over these three years franchise revenues
would increase by 12%. Vrooman (1995) also shows that NFL revenues are considerably less
win elastic than the other major US sports. However, if measured over a longer period of
time, the arguments laid out in (Vrooman, 2012) would imply a higher win elasticities.
Table 8 shows the impact of winning on franchise book values and revenues as measured by
a rolling average of the franchise’s win percentage between 2000 and 2017. Column 1 reports
the unconditional coefficient suggesting a 10 percentage point increase in the rolling win rate
is associated with approximately $50m in the annual book value over the sample period. A
10% point increase is equal to the median 8-8 team improving to 9.6 wins on average period
season, which is coincidentally almost exactly 1 standard deviation improvement. Thus a 2
standard deviation improvement is broadly equivalent to an 11-5 season on average and worth
approximately $100m in book value and $30m in revenue per annum. Therefore, a single win
in the regular season would be worth c.$10m per annum, on average in the long run. Recall,
from the estimates in section 4.1, a win would need to be worth approximately $10m for the
median QB wages to be equal to their marginal revenue product. Even allowing for a degree
of imprecision in these sample estimates it is remarkable that such a tight connection between
wages and marginal revenue product has emerged.
The set of control variables in Table 8 are also interesting. The set of year dummies capture
the growth in both book values and revenues and contribute to the high R-squared values
for the model’s fit. Indeed, there is more growth in the dependent variables over time than
there is variation between franchises so even the worst performing franchise will have made
money over the period. Nevertheless, the observable controls that capture variation between
franchises are also important. A set of controls for the initial conditions of the franchise in
1995 are included to capture long term legacy effects. The total number of historical wins
and the age of the franchise do not impact book value or revenue but a historical Super Bowl
win is worth approximately $63M ($13M in revenue). The stadium variables are statistically
and economically significant. An extra 1,000 in capacity is associated with $10M in value
and $3M in revenue. More expensive stadia raise revenues and book values (a 10% increase
in build cost is associated with $7M in book value and any stadia related debt is excluded
from the book values). Building a new stadium in the franchise period is associated with
$252M of value on average for that franchise (FE estimate) and each year the stadia is not
renewed costs the franchise $3.6M in book value. Turning to the Metropolian area controls: a
10% increase in local population is associated with c.$5M in franchise value albeit the growth
rate of the local area does not impact franchise values. Holding a monopoly over the local
metropolitan area is worth $295M relative to secondary franchises in the area (e.g. the New
York Jets) and $177M more than primary franchises (e.g. the New York Giants). The number
of substitute franchises from the other three main sports, Baseball, Basketball and Hockey
is positively associated with NFL franchise values and revenues. This reflects the fact that
franchise location is endogenous in the US and there are several examples of NFL franchises
relocating to higher demand local areas. In sports outside of the US, such as the English
Premier League, team location is more plausibly exogenous and one might expect a inverse
correlation between revenues and the number of substitute sporting events in the local area.
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Table 8: Sensitivity of winning to revenues and book values
Book Value Revenue
OLS (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) FE (6)
Rolling win percentage 498*** 352*** 377*** 152*** 85.8*** 147***
(4.52) (3.67) (2.69) (4.65) (3.58) (3.18)
Initial conditions in 1995
No. Wins 0.33 -0.059
(0.77) (-0.64)
No. Super Bowls 63.0*** 13.6***
(7.14) (7.11)
No. Post season years 1.94 1.28*
(0.55) (1.70)
Franchise age -4.25* -0.43
(-1.93) (-0.91)
Stadium variables
Capacity 10.00*** 2.96***
(8.06) (10.5)
Ln (total build cost) 71.0*** 15.9***
(6.50) (5.67)
New stadium 108*** 252*** 21.8*** 45.3***
(4.68) (8.99) (3.95) (7.15)
Yrs since expansion -3.66** -0.36
(-2.31) (-0.86)
Metropolitan Area controls
Ln population 49.5*** 7.44**
(3.31) (2.37)
Population growth rate -4.16 -3.52
(-0.27) (-1.05)
Only franchise 295*** 72.0***
(7.41) (8.31)
Main franchise 118** 12.5
(2.20) (1.08)
No. substitutes 60.6*** 16.2***
(4.20) (5.14)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 721 721 721 383 383 383
R-squared 0.835 0.899 0.912 0.694 0.867 0.905
No. teams 32 32 32 32 32 32
Notes:
1. Book values available 1995-2017. Revenues available for 2000, 2005, 2008-2017.
2. All monetary variables in Dec 2017 prices.
3. The estimated coefficient in column (3) and (6) implies 10 percentage point increase in the rolling win rate
increases book values by $50M and revenues by $15M respectively.
4. The R-squareds range between 69.4% and 91.2%. These high values are due to the large growth in franchise
book values and revenues that occurred over the sample period. This this growth is captured by the set of year
dummies. Excluding the year dummies reduces the R-squareds to between 0.4% and 46.2%.
After conditioning upon the set of observable controls in columns (2) and (5) the estimates
in row 1 for win percentage reduce by approximately one third. The fixed effects estimate
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in column (3) is close to that of column (2) reflecting the fact that most of the observable
controls relevant for book values do not change much over the sample period. The fixed effect
estimate for revenue in column (6) however is closer to the unconditional estimate that of
column (4). This is likely because the relevant controls for revenue do in fact vary within
franchises over the sample period. In particular, a new stadium is built in the sample period
is worth $45.3M in new revenue.
4.3 Wages and Productivity: Heterogeneity between Rookies and Veterans
From the estimates in section 4.1, a win needed to be worth approximately c.$10m for the
median QB wages to be equal to their marginal revenue product and the section above appear
to confirm that this is indeed the case. However, it is important to note that the estimates
of marginal productivity are derived from point estimates at the mean. As such, it can be
stated with reasonable confidence that quarterbacks close to the mean of the wage distribution
appear to be paid their close to their marginal revenue product. However, this result may mask
heterogeneity in the relationship between wages and productivity elsewhere in the distribution.
As shown in section 3, there is a wide distribution of wages both within the quarterback
position and between quarterbacks and other positions. To what extent can these differences
be explained by differences in productivity?
There are reasons to suspect that some players represent better value for money than others.
In particular, an important institutional friction of the NFL is a player’s eligibility for free
agency. Newly drafted players out of college, known as ‘rookies’, are not free to leave the
franchise to which they are drafted within the first four years of their career. The franchise
however can cut a player at any time. Only after four years do rookies become unrestricted
‘free agents’17. Hence there is a considerable difference in bargaining power between rookies
and veteran players. For example, Patrick Mahomes is a second year rookie who was promoted
to the starting QB for the Kansas City Chiefs at the beginning of the 2018 season and was
paid $3.7M in 2018, whereas the outgoing veteran QB Alex Smith was paid $13.4M in 2017
and secured a 4-year deal with the Washington Redskins worth $94M in 2018. Mahomes’ 2018
passing rating (to date) is 113.8 which is outperforming Smith’s rating 85.7 by a considerable
margin. Further, veterans are in short supply because many rookies will leave the NFL before
being eligible for free agency, either because they have a career ending injury or, more likely,
because they fail to make the roster of their franchise. This has been highlighted by Vrooman
(2012, p.8) who argues ‘It is common for veteran players to coalesce with management to
bargain away the rights of future generations of disenfranchised rookies and forgotten former
players. This creates a twisted bilateral monopoly where veteran players are often overpaid
because of upper-tier monopoly power, while rookies are exploited because of owners lower-tier
monopsony power’.
Table 9 shows the impact of being a rookie on wages. Rookies are paid 55%-56% less on average
than veteran players. It is important to note that this difference remains after controlling for
individual productivity and team level fixed effects. Productivity up to the season in which
wages are determined is captured by the ‘approximate value’ (AV) metric. This metric is
supplied by sports-reference.com and accounts for the points achieved (conceded) per drive
17Under current rules, franchises are also allowed to restrict the movement of one free agent known as the
‘franchise tag’.
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Table 9: Wages: Rookies vs Veterans
OLS FE
Coeff. t− stat Coeff. t− stat
Rookie -0.56*** (-16.1) -0.55*** (-16.0)
Age 0.012 (1.50) 0.017* (1.96)
ApproximateV aluet − 1 0.12*** (15.8) 0.12*** (15.3)
ProBowlt − 1 0.32*** (6.49) 0.32*** (6.54)
No.gamest − 1 0.020*** (7.78) 0.019*** (7.46)
Injury Reserve 0.015 (0.59) 0.016 (0.60)
Draft Round (1st round omitted)
2nd round -0.38*** (-8.64) -0.38*** (-8.94)
3rd round -0.60*** (-12.0) -0.60*** (-11.9)
4th round -0.61*** (-10.4) -0.61*** (-10.5)
5th round -0.75*** (-10.5) -0.75*** (-10.5)
6th round -0.77*** (-13.6) -0.77*** (-13.9)
7th round -0.84*** (-15.7) -0.85*** (-15.5)
Position (Quarterback omitted)
Defensive line -0.15 (-1.58) -0.13 (-1.41)
Defensive cover -0.099 (-0.99) -0.088 (-0.90)
Linebacker -0.26** (-2.59) -0.24** (-2.47)
Offensive line -0.14 (-1.68) -0.13 (-1.59)
Running back -0.34*** (-3.89) -0.33*** (-3.78)
Special teams -0.0100 (-0.088) -0.0059 (-0.052)
Wide Receiver -0.18* (-2.04) -0.16* (-1.88)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 3,941 3,941
Number Teams 32 32
R-squared 0.540 0.545
Cluster Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the variable ‘CAPHIT’ which is the official amount of wages
charged to the franchise’s salary cap for the year. Column 1 are OLS estimates and column 2 controls for
team-level fixed effects.
2. Rookie is a dummy identifying players on restricted contracts which typically last 4 or 5 years. Most players
enter the league at 21/22 years old and so players are typically 25/26 when they enter free agency. The estimates
imply that rookies are paid c.55% less than veterans for the same level of performance as measured by their
approximate value. Approximate value is supplied by sportsrefernce.com and combines detailed information
about on the field performances of players at all positions. Probowl identifies players who were invited to the
Pro Bowl which celebrates the best players in the two leagues (AFC and NFC) in that season.
3. There is a tight relationship between draft pick order and rookie wages because initial wages in the first
year out of the draft are set by collective bargaining. Undrafted players are excluded from the analysis above
because they immediately become free agents but have failed to make the draft selection.
and distributes these points based on the contribution of the player, in their position, to
those points. The AV metric for every player is recorded for every season on a scale of 0-26,
with the mean of 4 and a standard deviation of 3.72. Therefore a one standard deviation in
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productivity results in an increase in wages of approximately 44%. It is also noteworthy that
there is no impact of being placed on injured reserve (IR). This shows that the wages of
injured players are indeed honoured for the year and that the exclusion restriction requiring
that wages do not predict injuries appears to hold. Overall, the large differences in rookie and
veterans wages can not be solely explained by differences in their productivity. Given that
it was argued above that the median player is being paid close to their net marginal revenue
product, it is highly likely that rookies, (on average), are below their marginal product and
veterans above it. This is consistent with monopsonistic exploitation of rookies as advanced
by Vrooman (2012).
Alternatively, underpayment relative to marginal revenue product for rookies and overpayment
for veterans could reflect an non-exploitative model of deferred compensation as in (Lazear,
1979). One possible view of the large increase to player wages that occurs when players become
free agents is as an incentive mechanism for players to exert full effort both before and after
free agency. As rookies, players exert effort to maximise their marketability when they enter
free agency. If less than full effort is supplied the rookie risks dropping out of the league before
their big pay day. After entering free agency, veterans will also exert full effort because pay at
their franchise would exceed their outside option of their marginal product and so do not want
to risk being traded. Rookies are not exploited in this model because the optional value of
deferred compensation offsets the underpayment in wages. However, deferred compensation
contracts are more readily applicable to working environments where monitoring productivity
is prohibitively costly (Huck et al., 2011). Since rookie performances are easily observed and
under-performing rookies easily dismissed, it is hard to explain why a franchise would need
to adopt this incentive mechanism. Moreover, deferred compensation contracts are expensive.
Given the high degree of uncertainty associated with surviving until free agency rookies will
discount the optional value of the free agency pay-day by a considerable amount. A precise
estimate of the option value is difficult because survival rates vary significantly by player
quality and will be distorted by idiosyncratic risk preferences. However, using the draft pick
as a proxy for player quality, 77.4% of first round picks survive four years, while only 21.7%
of 7th round picks survive. 34.3% of the median draft pick survives 4 years in the league18.
Therefore the c.55% wage premium that veterans enjoy on average relative to rookies will be
discounted by average rookie by approximately 65% (assuming risk neutrality). As such it
is safe to conclude that most rookies are underpaid relative to their marginal product even
considering the option value of the free agency payday. Additionally, it is observed that
players move regularly between franchises when they enter free agency implying that their
current franchise is not prepared to offer them a veteran contract above their outside option,
as expected under the deferred compensation model.
5 Conclusion
The estimates obtained here for the marginal productivity of NFL players suggests that,
notwithstanding heterogeneity between rookies and veteran players, sportsmen in the NFL are
paid, on average, at a rate which is very close to their marginal contribution to the franchise’s
revenue. This was identified by observing the lost value from the reduction in win probability
18See https://www.milehighreport.com/2014/5/13/5713996/how-long-does-the-average-draft-pick-stick-
around
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from injured players being approximately equal to the wages earned by those injured players
on average. A dollar of injured talent is a dollar of productivity lost. This result provides
empirical support for models of sporting leagues such as (Fort and Quirk, 1995) where talent
is hired at a market clearing rate which is also equal to the firm’s marginal revenue of talent.
More generally, it provides evidence for a tight connection between wages and productivity
even when specific institutional constraints, in this case a salary cap and restricted rookie
contracts, act to hold down wages for some workers. The broad connection between wages
and marginal revenue product appears remarkably robust despite these frictions.
An opportunity to extend the research here is to build a dataset that links the timing of an
on-field injury to the real time movement of in-play betting odds. While historical in-play
odds are not currently publicly available, private betting companies own datasets containing
such information. This would provide an unambiguous connection between the injury to the
player and the change in the probability of winning the game. If access to such data was
opened up to academics for research purposes, this would allow one to more precisely identify
the immediate impact of injury on the probability of winning by using the market reaction
as a close proxy for the change in probability. These movements could then be compared the
player’s wages19.
A second opportunity to build upon the research here would be to explore the role of non-
productivity related characteristics such as the race of the player. Although race is not
identified in this data, the NFLPA collects self-identified demographic information on NFL
players. If access to this data was made available to academics, given the detailed individual
level data on productivity already in the public domain, it would be possible to determine the
extent to which race played or continues to play a role in the wages of NFL players and the
success of NFL franchises.
19This was suggested by David Forrest at the European Sports Economics Association 2018.
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Appendix
Note to Editor: The following is not intended for print but can be made available on-line. It
is included here for the referees. If some of the material below is regarded as central to the
paper I am happy to include and discuss in the paper. Likewise, I’m happy to move more
material to the appendix if deemed necessary.
Evidence supporting Exclusion Restriction
Table A1: Balance test for within game injuries to starting Quarterbacks
No QB injury Injury to QB Difference
mean mean p
Passing Rating 88.99 72.47 16.52 0.00
Ln Injured Money (net) -0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.59
Starter Gini (net) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.77
Starter/Non-Starter (net) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.67
Away 0.50 0.48 0.02 0.60
Ln Wage Bill (net) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.16
Rest Days (net) 0.01 -0.07 0.07 0.70
Vegas Spread 0.02 -0.24 0.26 0.58
N 2369 192 2561
Notes:
1. As expected, starting QB have significantly higher average passing rating that backup QBs
2. Crucially, there are no significant difference in means between other observable variables.
This is consistent with the exclusion restriction that requires injuries to occur randomly. In
particular, teams with higher or lower wage bills do not experience injuries more often and
crucially, the market is unable to predict a within-game injury to the starting QB.
29
Table A2: Do wages predict injuries?
No games missed Season long injury
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln wages 0.017 -0.021** -0.0046 -0.0047 0.0046* 0.0072*
-1.44 (-2.14) (-0.32) (-0.88) -1.84 -1.95
Age 0.019 -0.077 0.0033 0.0018
-0.78 (-1.52) -0.64 -0.17
Age squared -0.00024 0.0013 -0.000066 0.000065
(-0.57) -1.5 (-0.73) -0.36
Starter -0.037* -0.015 -0.0095** -0.0049
(-1.85) (-0.56) (-1.98) (-0.75)
Approximate Value 0.074*** 0.079*** -0.0061*** -0.0045***
-33.4 -26.6 (-8.89) (-5.66)
Pro Bowl -0.18*** -0.13*** 0.031*** 0.020***
(-6.05) (-4.08) -8.32 -4.97
Ln Wage bill 0.03 -0.00067 0.0069 0.009
-0.55 (-0.0100) -0.52 -0.63
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Position dummies no yes no no yes no
Player FE yes no yes yes no yes
Observations 6,795 6,103 6,103 6,795 6,103 6,103
R-squared 0.001 0.248 0.176 0.001 0.078 0.058
Notes:
1. Linear probability model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if no games are missed due to injury in
columns (1)-(3) and if all games are missed in columns (4)-(6). Standard errors are clustered at the player level.
2. Column 2 indicates a marginal impact of wages on injury propensity. A player is 2 percentage points more likely to
miss no games in the season if their wages double. However, this is not robust to player fixed effects. Likewise column 5
suggests a weak correlation between season long injuries and wage but again not robust to player fixed effects
3. Approximate Value is a performance metric calculated by sports-reference.com and Pro Bowl indicates whether the
player was selected to the Pro Bowl. Unsurprisingly, these variables reflect the fact that non-injured players are more
likely to perform well during the season
4. Interestingly, there is no robust relationship between starting and injury which is surprising given a starting player
would be expected to play more minutes than squad players. This suggests a large part of injury risk occurs away from
match day (e.g. during training)
Additional Tables
The regression analysis of injuries and wins at season level in section 3.2 returns estimates
on the conditional mean. However, it is possible the impact of injuries could vary within the
distribution. To explore this, a quantile regression was run and the table of results is shown
below. The effect sizes are larger at the extremes in the distribution, at the 90th and 10th
percentile, relative to the middle of the distribution. There is not definitive reason for this,
but one might speculate that top teams need to avoid injuries to star players to remain at the
top, while weak teams do not have the squad depth to replace their starting players. Teams
in the middle might have a more balanced squad where injured starters can be replaced by
strong backup players.
30
Table A3: Injuries and wins: Season level quantile regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Ln Injured money -0.36*** -0.19* -0.11 -0.21* -0.40***
(-3.28) (-1.66) (-1.10) (-1.71) (-2.83)
Ln Wage bill 0.16 1.48* 2.06*** 2.14* 2.82**
(0.12) (1.67) (2.78) (1.96) (2.37)
Ln Wage bill SD -0.12 -1.28 -1.63*** -1.09 -1.65*
(-0.087) (-1.57) (-3.23) (-1.19) (-1.84)
Observations 213 213 213 213 213
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:
1. This table presents quantile regression results of the total injured money incurred by a franchise during the season
upon the proportion of wins in a season. The dependent variable is the percentage of games won wi in the season t
expressed in log odds: wit = ln(wit/(1 −wit))
2. The sign on injured money indicates a negative relationship at each percentile. While column (5) suggests a slightly
stronger unconditional impact at the 90th percentile there is no significance difference between the 90th percentile and
the 10th percentile. The effect sizes in the middle of the distribution are more modest.
Table A4: Impact of winning on finances: short run
OLS FE
Value Revenue Income Value Revenue Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Winpct−1 187* 31.7* 10.1 -2.93 -16.6 -15.0*
(1.80) (1.89) (0.85) (-0.29) (-0.22) (-1.72)
PostseasonWint−1 37.7 6.47 10.3 6.52 43.1 11.2**
(0.69) (0.73) (1.63) (1.29) (1.16) (2.57)
ChampionshipWint−1 -42.1 -7.66 -14.2 -4.52 -12.6 -12.3
(-0.40) (-0.44) (-1.15) (-0.46) (-0.18) (-1.45)
SuperBowlWint−1 202 28.1 24.8 12.1 49.9 16.6
(1.50) (1.27) (1.57) (0.97) (0.54) (1.54)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 445 383 383 383 445 383
R-squared 0.762 0.686 0.337 0.887 0.887 0.548
Teams 32 32 32 32 32 32
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:
1. This table estimates the elasticity of winning in the season prior on the book value, revenue and operating income of
NFL franchises over the sample period. The sample period begins in 2000 and ends 2017 omitting the years 2001-2004
and 2006-2007 as financial data was not available on NFL franchises in these years. Columns (1) to (3) report OLS
regression and columns (4) through (6) the fixed effects estimates.
2. While there has been a large appreciation in book values, revenues and income of NFL franchises over the sample
period there is no robust relationship between winning and any of the financial variables in the short run. This result is
consistent with the arguments laid out in Vrooman (2012).
Example Contracts
Panel A of Table A5 shows the structure of Andrew Luck’s contract which he signed in 2016.
Luck was the starting QB for the Indianpollis Colts. Media reports will typically headline the
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total value of the contract when it is signed, in this case “$140m” 20. However, this amount is
spread over six years and while Luck received $47m guaranteed on signing (a $12m salary plus
$32m signing bonus plus $3m roaster bonus) these amounts can be spread over the duration
of the contract to even out the Cap Hit. While the player can be cut at any time, monies
guaranteed on signing would hit the cap immediately in the year that the player is cut. The
‘Dead Money’ in the final column records the amount charged to the Cap in the event that
the player is cut in that year.
Table A5: Andrew Luck’s contract vs Scott Tolzien
Panel A: Starting Quarter Back
Year Salary Signing Roster Cap Hit Dead Money
2016 12m 6.4m 0 18.4m 47m
2017 7m 6.4m 6m 19.4m 28.6m
2018 12m 6.4m 6m 24.4m 19.2m
2019 9.125m 6.4m 12m 27.525m 12.8m
2020 11m 6.4m 11m 28.4m 6.4m
2021 11m 0 10m 21m 0
Panel B: Back up Quarter Back
Year Salary Signing Roster Cap Hit Dead Money
2016 1.25m 0.25m 0 1.5m 0.5m
2017 1.75m 0.25m 0 2.0m 0.25m
By contrast, panel B details the Colt’s backup QB, Scott Tolzien’s contract. Tolzien signed a
2 year contract with $0.5m guaranteed on signing and none of salary guaranteed. As a result
Tolzien could be cut at the end of 2016 with only a $0.25M charge to the 2017 cap.
20See http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000672131/article/andrew-luck-signs-sixyear-140-million-
colts-contract
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Fig. 1: Replication of Card & Dahl 2011 showing the pre-match Vegas Spread is an unbiased
predictor of the final score
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Final Score Differential versus the Pregame Point Spread 1995−2015
Realized score differential is opponents minus home team’s final score. An increase in one point on the spread
implies the opposition will get one more point over the home team on average. The plotted regression line has
an intercept of -0.11 (s.e. 0.20), a slope of 1.02 (s.e. 0.03) and a R-squared of 0.17. Card & Dahl (2011, p121)
with data 1996-2005 find an intercept of -0.17 (s.e. = 0.21) and slope 1.01 (s.e. = 0.03) and a R-squared of
0.20.
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Table A6: Variable Definitions
Variable Description
Player wage variables
Salary Annual salary in nominal dollars
Signing Signing bonus in nominal dollars
Roster Roster bonus in nominal dollars
Dead Money The outstanding charge in nominal dollars to the franchise’s salary cap in the event that the player is cut before
the contract expires
Ln wages The official charge to the salary cap for the player in year t
Injury variables: Season level
Ln Injured money Natural log of the sum of all player wages * x/16, where x is the number of games of the regular season in year t
the player missed due to injury
Ln(Wage bill) Natural log of the total wage bill of the franchise in year t
Ln(Wage bill standard deviation) Natural log of the standard deviation of the wage bill of the franchise in year t
Injury variables: Game level
Ln Injured money (net) Natural log of the sum of all player wages who are injured in that game minus the same figure for the opposition
Starter Gini (net) The gini coefficient of the wages of starting players net of the opposition
Starter/Non-Starter (net) The ratio of the starting wages to non-starting wages net of the figure for the opposition
Away Dummy variable taking the value of one if the game is an away fixture*
Ln Wage Bill (net) Natural log of the total wage bill of the franchise in year t net of the figure for the opposition
Rest Days (net) Number of days since the last fixture, net of the figure for the opposition
Vegas Spread Number of points on the pre-kickoff spread
Injury variables: Within game quarterbacks (QBs)
Injured QB Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the starting QB is injured during the game
Injured QB opponent Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the opposition’s starting QB is injured during the game
Backup QB wage diff. The difference in natural log of wages between the starting and backup QB when the starting QB is injured
during the game
Backup QB opponent wage diff. The difference in natural log of wages between the opposition’s starting and backup QB when the opposition’s starting
QB is injured during the game
Passing Rating The official passing rating of the QB for the game
Passing Rating opponent The official passing rating of the opposition’s QB for the game
Franchise value dependent variables
Revenue Revenue in nominal dollars (millions) as recorded by Forbes.com
Book Value Book value in nominal dollars (millions) of franchise based on current stadium deal at time t deducting stadium
debt (Forbes.com)
Operating Income Earnings before interest, taxes, deprecation and amortization in nominal dollars (millions) (Forbes.com)
Franchise Value Control Variables
Rolling win percentage Rolling average of the percentage of wins in the regular season
Initial conditions in 1995
No. Wins Number of wins in the regular season up to 1995
No. Super Bowls Number of Super Bowl wins up to 1995
No. Post season years Number of seasons up to 1995 when the team qualified for the post season playoffs
Franchise age 1995 - the original year the franchise was founded
Stadium variables
Capacity Capacity of the stadium at time t
Ln (total build cost) Natural log of total build cost of stadium at time t in 2017 prices
New stadium Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a new stadium was built between 1995 and 2017
Yrs since expansion Number of years at time t since the last increase in stadium capacity
Metropolitan Area controls
Ln population Natural log the population in the metro area
Population growth rate Percentage change in population between 2016 and 2010
Only franchise Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if franchise i is the only NFL franchise in the metropolitan area
Main franchise Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if franchise i is the largest NFL franchise in the metropolitan area
(e.g. New York Giants)
No. substitutes Number of National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball or National Hockey League franchises in the
metropolitan area
Wage determinants
Rookie Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if player is on their first contract
Age Player’s age as recorded by sports− reference.com
Approximate Value Player’s Approximate value as recorded by sports− reference.com
Pro Bowl Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if player played in the season’s pro bowl
No. games Number of games where the player featured in at least one play in the season
Injury Reserve Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the player was on injury reserve
Draft Round 2nd-7th Set of dummy variables taking the value of 1 according to where the player drafted. 1st round draft picks are the
baseline category
Short run franchise performance variables
Winpc Percentage of wins in the regular season of 16 games
Postseason Win Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the franchise won a game in the postseason
Championship Win Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the franchise won their championship game in the postseason
Super Bowl Win Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the franchise won the Super Bowl in the postseason
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